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UNIVERSITY OF ALASKA, FAIRBANKS.
FFEMW@UAF.EDU

Introduction
The Fall 2002 issue of the Comparative Civilizations Review (No.
47) carried an article by Benesch and Wilner entitled "Traditions and
Civilizations: Another Approach to Understanding Human History."
The thesis of the article was that "traditions" broadly defined might
prove more useful in comparing actual and practical aspects of dynamic societies and cultures than the static classifications of "civilizations."
Tradition entails processes and patterns of thinking so basic that the
underlying assumptions can be considered axiomatic. These presuppositions frame the worldviews upon which a tradition relies. They
explain and separate mental events from natural events, or conceptions
from perceptions within different experience/language continua. In the
following article, I propose to continue the idea of comparing traditions,
rather than civilizations, by examining parallels, both actual and imagined, between Eastern Mysticism (EM) and Western Science (WS). I
believe that this approach will facilitate a clearer understanding of both
contemporary EM and WS.
Many modern physical scientists and philosophers of science have
emphasized the similarities between modern physics and certain aspects
of Eastern mysticism (e.g. Bohr,1 Hayward, 2 Zukav, 3 Leshan and
Margenau, 4 and Goswami 5 ). These similarities, especially as they relate
to Eastern philosophical systems and Eastern epistemological and logical approaches, have been discussed by Benesch," Benesch and Wilner, 7
Capra, 8 Siu,' and Shriman & Benesch 10 who have argued that today's
WS seems to be disclosing a universe that fits EM better than (to follow
Benesch's terminology)" a "thingist," Greek/Judeo-Christian worldview. In Capra's words:
In the schools of Western philosophy, logic and reasoning have
always been the main tools used to formulate philosophical ideas and
this is true, according to Bertrand Russell, even of religious philosophies. In Eastern mysticism, on the other hand, it has always been
realized that reality transcends ordinary language and the sages of the
East were not afraid to go beyond logic and common concepts. This
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is the main reason, I think, why their models of reality constitute a
more appropriate philosophical background to modern physics than
the models of Western philosophy.12

The targets of these claims (i.e., the would-be common elements
between the two systems) will not be questioned here. 11 Instead, I will
examine what should we do with them. To explore this issue, I will concentrate on Fritjof Capra's influential book: "The Tao of Physics". 14
With Capra, I would agree that an important shift in the sciences has
taken place. I will illustrate this point with current thinking in biology
that shows that the biological sciences have been undergoing a closer
shift to EM ever since Darwin. But I will also use this example to counter Capra's conceptual analysis of this important shift. Capra derives
great significance from the parallels between WS and EM, claiming that
they denote convergence of content and a paradigm shift in WS. Against
Capra, I would argue that the parallels between WS and EM, though
heuristically important, do not denote a profound "harmony" between
the two conceptions, nor a paradigm shift in science.
Capra's Eastern Mysticism
Capra argues that common to most strands of EM are the ideas of
universal interconnectedness (observer included); a stress on dynamic
processes instead of static entities; an emphasis on the necessary consistency for such interconnectedness as the determinant of the nature of
things; the absence of fundamental levels — with their fundamental laws
and entities; and the realization that experience — not conceptualization
— can grasp such a system, that is, to put it slightly differently, knowledge of the system depends upon experiencing, not theorizing it. Let me
illustrate this with just two examples.
For instance, Capra cites Needham, who argued that the idea of
"law of nature" was lacking in the "Chinese world view." Needham
maintained, Capra continues, that the Chinese held the idea of "Li" or
"principle of organization" instead:
In its most ancient meaning, it signified the pattern in things, the
markings of jade or fibers in muscle ... It acquired the common dictionary meaning "principle," but always conserved the undertone of
"pattern" ... There is "law" implicit in it. but this law is the law to
which parts of wholes have to conform by virtue of their very existence as parts of wholes ... The most important thing about parts is
that they have to fit precisely into place with the other parts in the
whole organism which they compose.15
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Similarly, Capra stresses that WS, just like EM, conceives that reality is discovered through experiencing the latter's unity and interconnectedness and not by hopelessly attempting to articulate some fundamental nature in terms of this or that conceptual concoction. He sites the
5th Century CE Buddhist philosopher, Ashvagosha, to anchor this parallel with EM:
All things in their fundamental nature are not namable or explicable.
They cannot be adequately expressed in any form of language.16

This should suffice to give an idea of how Capra establishes the
parallel elements between EM and WS. With these parallels outlined,
Capra moves next to establish the proposition that WS, thanks to EM,
is moving the system away from its "old" scientific paradigm which had
in the past been fueled by the Western Judeo-Christian worldview.
Capra's "New" Western Science
Capra argues that one of the central ideas underlying WS can be
traced to the Judeo-Christian tradition. This, Capra continues, is the
assumption of the existence of fundamental laws and their fundamental
entities that are responsible for the phenomena we observe. The existence of such a matrix of laws and entities structuring experience was
perceived to be, of course, God's idea. Capra easily finds several quotes
for the existence of this rational matrix of eternal, divine laws in classic
authors such as Aquinas, Descartes, and Newton—especially as these
reflected a synthesis with the "idealism" and "realism" of Plato and
Aristotle. But, Capra argues, this hierarchy with fundamental laws and
particles at its foundations cannot be found in today's physics. In his
own words:
In the new worldview, the universe is seen as a dynamic web of interrelated events. None of the properties of any part of this web is fundamental; they all follow from the properties of the other parts, and
the overall consistency of their mutual interrelations determines the
structure of the entire web.17

[I]n a universe which is an inseparable whole and where all forms are
fluid and ever-changing, there is no room for any fixed fundamental
entity.18

Thus, Capra argues, scientific representations (models and theories) suffer from the same unavoidable limitations that the mystics in
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Eastern civilizations, especially in India and China, assign to all conceptual constructions. With them, Capra argues that science's descriptions and explanations of the world are necessarily limited by the nature
of representations in general, and by the nature of this world in particular. More precisely, according to Capra, the first limitation follows from
the (necessarily) approximate nature of all representations. Echoing
Ashvagosha, Capra argues that:
The natural world ... is one of infinite varieties and complexities, a
multidimensional world that contains no straight lines or completely
regular shapes, where things do not happen in sequences, but all
together... In thinking about the world we are faced with the same
kind of problem as the cartographer who tries to cover the curved face
of the Earth with a sequence of plane maps. We can only expect an
approximate representation of reality from such procedure, and all
rational knowledge is necessarily limited."

The second unavoidable limitation of science follows from the
nature of the world. As indicated above, Capra claims that the nature of
the outside world is not determined by some set of basic laws and their
basic particles, but by the interconnectedness of everything with everything else. In other words, Capra concludes, if the nature of any "thing"
is determined by the consistency requirements imposed by this given
any thing's interconnectedness to everything else, then any explanation
of this given any thing that does not include everything else (i.e. any
humanly possible explanation) is unavoidably incomplete. In Capra's
words:
Physicists have come to see that all their theories of natural phenomena, including the "laws" they describe, are creations of the human
mind, properties of our conceptual map of reality, rather than of reality itself. This conceptual scheme is necessarily limited and approximate, as are all scientific theories and "laws of nature" it contains. All
natural phenomena are interconnected, and in order to explain any
one of them we need to understand all the others, which is obviously
impossible.20

As I mentioned in my introduction, I will not counter Capra's
description of a strikingly changed modern physics, or modern science
in general—as these have developed within the Greco-European and
monotheistic traditions. 21 I will question Capra's conceptual understanding of this striking shift. I will preface my analysis with an exam-
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pie from a non-physics scientific discipline: Biology. I will later use
this example to support Capra's claim (and also mine) of a remarkable
shift in modern science. But I will use this example to illustrate the
problems I see with his conceptual analysis of this shift.
The "New" Science of Biology
Like Capra with physics, Walter Benesch and I have argued that
modern evolutionary and ecological theorizing fit the Eastern worldview (2004). Biological genes, for instance, are not discrete, fundamental bead-like things in a DNA string. Their biological function, mediated by their translation into particular amino acids, seems not to be the
result of some chemical necessity. The translation of DNA into amino
acids results from what Francis Crick 22 called "a frozen accident":
when an original particular DNA sequence is arbitrarily associated with
a particular amino acid type and this meaning becomes established in
the evolving lineages of life by common descent (1968). Furthermore,
a gene's biological effect is determined contextually. Genes behave very
much unlike a fundamental particle following some kind of universal
law. The following example illustrates this point.
Imagine, for instance, a beetle bearing a short, heritable sequence
of DNA that makes it prone to boring its nests in a particular species of
cactus. The translation code from DNA sequence into the amino acids
that mediate this tendency is universal, but it does not follow any known
chemical or biological necessity (the same way that the words "dog" or
"perro" have no necessary tie to the doggy creatures they refer to).
Biological theory requires one to claim that this beetle species has
a gene for cactus nesting. Now, if a storm blows this beetle off to a nearby island where no cacti grow, the genetic sequence will, of course, still
be there. But the gene for cactus nesting will cease to exist. To put it
more precisely, the genetic sequence in question is context independent,
thingist—like, but the causal biological properties of the sequence are
process-like, contextual, multilevel phenomena.
Thus, a gene's biological function is determined not only by its
multileveled context of genetic developmental programs, but also by its
effects in other spots in the multileveled biological hierarchy, e.g. individual creature, kin group, population, etc. Again, and putting it slightly differently, in a contextual vacuum, there are DNA sequences, but
there are no such things as genes for anything.
The move towards a process-like, multileveled, and contextually
determined understanding in Biology is not restricted to the realm of the
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very small. Very recently (in 1995) wolves were introduced again into
Yellowstone Park - where they had been eradicated by the 1920's. In
less than twenty years after reintroduction, riverbed erosion was stalled,
elk and coyote populations went down; and beaver, magpie, raven, vole,
grizzly, cougar, eagle, and trout populations went up (see, for instance,
Smith et al).23
It is hard to imagine more intricate and unexpected connections!
With their most efficient, natural predators back in the Park, elk populations went down. Elk carcasses became readily available, feeding
bears, eagles, magpies, and ravens. The coyote population went down
to fifty percent; killed or displaced by the wolves. The coyote's preferred prey, voles, started flourishing. This made foxes very happy, and
they followed the vole's increase. Being hunted again, elk became far
more cautious. They stopped frequenting open spaces (like riverbeds
and open river valleys) and grazing most of the vegetation there.
Willows and aspens in these places reclaimed their traditional distribution. New growth near watercourses convinced the beavers to come
back. As a result of these last two elements combined, pools, woody
debris, and an overall slowing down of the rivers' current followed,
decreasing bank erosion and creating the necessary habitat for healthier
trout populations.
This should suffice to illustrate that, like the new physics, WS in
biology is also disclosing a world full of interconnectedness, multileveled processes, and contextual meanings as these are basic to the traditions of EM. Now, we can move to the next question in this essay:
what should one make of all these parallels and conceptual shifts?
What Parallels Cannot Do
Capra finds profound significance in the parallels outlined above.
For Capra, "physics leads today to a world view which is essentially
mystical." 24 For Capra, these two conceptions converge and feed on
each other to transform the way we see the world. In his own words:
[T]he awareness of the profound harmony between the worldview of
modem physics and the views of Eastern mysticism now appears as
an integral part of a much larger cultural transformation, leading to a
new vision of reality that will require a fundamental change in our
thoughts, perceptions, and values.25

I do not disagree that EM and the new WS can inspire the profound
changes envisioned by Capra. But there are two cautionary points I wish
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to address in these regards. First, I wish to counter the associated (and
most times implicit) idea that converging conceptions of different traditions are somehow validated by their convergence. Second, I wish to
counter Capra's explicit claim that the emergence of the new WS should
be understood as a Kuhnian paradigm shift within the WS tradition. Let
us discuss the implicit meaning of the first point first.
Two Rights Do Not Make One True
Capra's words resonate with a very common misconception. Some
people think that showing agreement between science and a given traditional conception is a good thing for the traditional conception in
question. 26 I find this idea very problematic. To conclude that a fit
between a given worldview and today's science validates the worldview, one needs to assume at least two quite problematic ideas. First,
one needs to assume (mistakenly, of course) that there are no hermeneutical dimensions to such issues and that translation between the two systems is a straightforward matter. And second, one needs to assume that
convergence in results between some elements in science and worldview exports validation from one inferential method to the other.
Even if one is willing to grant the thorny issue that science is capturing some feature of the world correctly (which, by the way, I do), and
even if (for the sake of this paper) we bypass the most serious and obvious hermeneutical issues in the translation between the two systems
(my first point above), it makes little sense to construe science and
worldview as remotely talking about the same thing.
Science, amongst other things, produces families of models of
unobservable causal processes, ideally described in mathematical language, lying beyond experience, usually resulting from the deployment
of complex technology, that allow practitioners to manipulate, predict,
and/or explain observable phenomena. In very general terms, models
are made of unobservable, mathematical entities/processes that
explain/predict the regularities of nature (observable and otherwise). 27
The interpretation of such products into elements belonging to
every-day experience is, to say the least, a thorny technical question. In
other words, science's unobservable processes — especially those of
subatomic particle physics, which is one of Capra's main foci of attention — are very far removed and often contradict our species' experience, common sense, and imagination. 28 As quantum physicists tend to
suggest, whoever claims to be able to imagine the world of quantum
physics, is lying, or does not know what he/she is talking about. Given
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this asymmetry alone, one should expect that most translations between
the elements in WS's models and non-theoretical, non-technological,
non-mathematical elements in any given worldview are bound to be
hopelessly superficial and, most likely, incorrect.
Now, even if one grants the previous point (that there are no serious hermeneutical and scientific concerns in the translation between
EM and WS), the export of validation between converging inferential
processes makes very little sense. Though this point should not be controversial, I will, for the sake of completeness, first establish this type
of mistake with a counterexample, and then explain why it is a mistake.
Let us imagine that you guess that I have three dollars and 33 cents
in my left pocket, and that, after counting how much money I have in
that pocket, I agree with you. Obviously, this coincidence should not be
enough to validate both methods of knowing how much money I have
in my left pocket (i.e. guessing versus counting). The explanation
behind this counterexample demonstration should also be rather obvious. Since coincidences happen for good reasons and also for no reason
at all, when it comes to judging processes, we like to look at the
processes themselves - and not only their products. In short, I have
shown that even bypassing several serious problems, agreement in conclusion for inferential processes A and B does not necessarily say anything about the quality of either process. Now, let us build the positive
case for the parallels between EM and WS.
What Parallels Can Do
As Walter Benesch has argued (see above), EM provides a framework that can be more conducive to capturing what's really going on out
there. If the natural world is not really divided into neat and discrete
things, such as species; and/or there are no fundamental particles, such
as indivisible atoms or fundamental genes, then a framework that can
only see discrete things arranged into foundational hierarchical systems
is simply not going to be very productive.
If, on the other hand, nature is structured in systems with huge
interconnectedness, where processes and contextual meanings are the
norm (and foundational hierarchies just one possible mode of structuring), then EM provides a basic framework of understanding that is
much more productive. As I have shown above, and Capra has shown
extensively in his work, EM-type systems seem to be quite common out
there. Thus, methodologically speaking, looking at the world with a pair
of EM glasses should in general be the most productive stance to take.
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For the working scientist, conceiving the world through an EM lens
should in general result in better fitting theories and models. This I call
the heuristic advantage of adopting an EM-framework.
But one should not confuse this capacity to provide basic heuristic
guidelines with the existence of a harmonious coincidence between the
EM and WS (that is, what Capra declared above). First of all, "harmony" is a slippery word. Even if one disregards the word's vagueness, it
has a misleading ring. It could hint to the idea that there is some kind of
agreement about what both systems say about the world. And, as I have
argued above, such contents' comparisons are bound to be superficial
and can lead to the kind of justificatory feedback loop that is best to be
avoided.
The word "heuristic," on the other hand, stresses that the role of
EM is pragmatic, or tactical. Putting it in a Kantian way, EM provides
the scientist with the very basic categories that allows him/her to best
tackle phenomena. So, content agreement, like the "would-be-convergence" between Greek metaphysical atomic theory and today's physical
atomic theory, must be considered at best as a philosophically uninteresting coincidence. The relationship between EM and WS should be
understood in the light of the comparative fruitfulness of adopting one
particular stance (EM) instead of another (Greek/thingist).
We will now move to the next objective of this paper: to analyze
Capra's conception of the impact that the adoption of an EM-stance has
on the question of scientific change.
Paradigms and Change
Kuhnian Paradigms and the Question of Progress
Thus far, and for the sake of the argument, I have basically agreed
with Capra's claims that there is an important shift going on in modern
WS. Now, I will qualify this agreement. Questions regarding the magnitude and nature of change (in science and in general) are very important because they usually come hand in hand with questions regarding
the continuity of whatever it is that is changing. In the philosophy of
science, such questions are tied to the question of scientific progress.
More precisely, for scientific knowledge to be a progressive process
(i.e. getting closer to capturing the causal processes behind phenomena;
or at least saving the latter - if one is of an empiricist persuasion) it
should change in a more or less continuous, cumulative fashion.
Thus, if science is progressive, previous scientific developments
provide the (ever-broadening) base for new scientific developments
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(e.g. Boyd,-' Leplin, 30 Putnam"). If this condition were not to be the
case, that is, if scientific change is discontinuous in the sense that there
is a disconnect between previous and present scientific developments,
the question of progress becomes very unclear. Each episode of discontinuous science would amount to a restart that, really, goes nowhere. An
extreme case for discontinuity can be found in the (very influential)
work of Thomas Kuhn. 32
For Kuhn, the history of science is a string of disconnected periods
of "normal science" punctuated by periods of "revolutionary science."
At each side of a scientific revolution, Kuhn stresses, two incommensurable bubbles of normal science lie; each one self-contained and completely isolated within its own "paradigm." Kuhn talks about paradigms
as an "entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, and so on
shared by the members of a given community." (1970, p. 175).33 Kuhn
explains the "most fundamental aspect of the incommensurability of
competing paradigms" as follows:
In a sense that I am unable to explicate further, the proponents of
competing paradigms practice their trades in different worlds. ...
Practicing in different worlds, the two groups of scientists see different things when they look from the same point in the same direction.
... That is why a law that cannot even be demonstrated to one group
of scientists may occasionally seem intuitively obvious to another.
Equally, it is why before they can hope to communicate fully, one
group or the other must experience the conversion that we have been
calling a paradigm shift. Just because it is a transition between incommensurables, it cannot be made a step at a time, forced by logic and
neutral experience. Like the gestalt switch, it must occur all at once
(though not necessarily in an instant) or not at all. (Kuhn, 1970, p.
150).

Capra argues that the new shift in WS amounts to a "discontinuous,
revolutionary" break: a Kuhnian paradigm shift. In his own words:
Today, twenty-five years after Kuhn's analysis, we recognize the paradigm shift in physics as an integral part of a much larger cultural
transformation. The intellectual crisis of the quantum physicists in the
1920's is mirrored today by a similar but much broader cultural crisis. Accordingly, what we are seeing is a shift of paradigms not only
within science, but also in the larger social arena. (Capra, 1996, p. 5).
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Capra's paradigm shift: Interconnectedness
Above, I mentioned that Capra presented a number of elements
while building his case for a paradigm shift in WS - e.g. an emphasis
on the necessary consistency as the determinant of the nature of things;
or the absence of fundamental levels. I will build my argument against
Capra focusing, mainly, on one such element: interconnectedness. 1 will
do this for two reasons.
First, Capra utilizes this element to make bold philosophical
claims. Capra argues that because of interconnectedness, the nature of
such a foundational conception as explanation must change (in a
Kuhnian-paradigmatic way).
My second reason for focusing on interconnectedness is more pragmatic. On the one hand, it means respecting Capra's own emphasis: he
spends a considerable amount of time dealing with this element. But on
the other hand, I must confess, it reflects my own biology-bias: interconnectedness is excellently illustrated by biological examples. In any
event (and this will hopefully become clearer below), in the end, I will
suggest that the problem with Capra's argument is an in-principle problem (underlying all the elements outlined by this author). And my focus
on interconnectedness plays no analytical role in my in-principle criticism. I will argue that Capra's list of would-be paradigm-shifting elements is a list of changes in emphasis, content, or degree.
But, as we saw Kuhn stress, a paradigm shift requires changes of
such substance that leave the sides at either end enclosed, in a manner of
speaking, in separate and disconnected universes (see also Scheffler). 34
But let us start with the philosophically rich arena that interconnectedness offers and then use it to establish my in-principle criticism.
According to Capra, the realization of profound interconnectedness
revolutionized both our conception of what the world is like and what
explanation of this world can be. Capra believes that the high degree of
interconnectedness makes the old search for fundamental laws and their
fundamental entities nonsensical. Thus, he continues, a paradigm shift
takes place, with "web philosophy" at its heart. In Capra's words:
If everything is connected to everything else, how can we ever hope
to understand anything? Since all natural phenomena are ultimately
interconnected, in order to explain any one of them we need to understand all the others, which is obviously impossible. What makes it
possible to turn [this] ... web philosophy into scientific theory is the
fact that there is approximate knowledge. If one is satisfied with an
approximate understanding of nature, one can describe selected
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groups of phenomena in this way, neglecting other phenomena that
are less relevant. Thus, one can explain many phenomena in terms of
a few, and consequently understand different aspects of nature in an
approximate way without having to understand everything at once. (p.
333, Capra 1991, my italics).

Interconnectedness and Explanation
Let us grant, for the sake of the argument, the very reasonable claim
that mere mortals cannot know all existing connections. But does this
mean, like Capra claims, that one cannot explain the highly interconnected system in question? I see two important problems with Capra's
conception of explanation. First it conflates the idea of complete
description with the idea of good explanation. Second, it assumes that
explanations can be assessed considering only the nature of the system
to be explained - and not the knower doing the explaining.
A huge difficulty with the conflating of description and explanation
is that the idea at its core: full description, is untenable. The idea of listing all connections for any given system makes little or no sense
because such a list is infinite. This should be easy to demonstrate.
Consider, for instance, that every member of Homo sapiens whose total
number of atoms, at this very moment, ends with the number 1 belongs
to the set 'Homo Sapiens 1.' Members of Homo Sapiens 1 are thus connected. Obviously, if I had infinite time, I could devise an equivalent set
for every number - thus having an infinite number of sets. But nobody
should argue that to explain, for instance, the origin of our species one
needs to know the infinite set of connections I described above.
Probably the most fundamental difficulty with Capra's requirement
of "full-connection knowledge" to explain anything is that not all connections are explanatory. In fact, Capra himself adds a great deal of
internal tension to his view when he points out that, in this fully interconnected universe, some connections are more relevant than others
(see my italics in the quote above). 35
What Capra does not seem to realize is that once you grant a hierarchy of relevance, you detangle the problem of complete description
from that of explanation. Or, putting it slightly different, in a system
where only some connections are explanatory, partial knowledge (as
long as it includes the explanatory connections) can provide precise
explanations (and not, as Capra stresses, approximate ones).
The key question now is, of course, which connections are the
explanatory ones—or what makes a given connection an explanatory
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one? And this brings us to the second problem with Capra's conception
of explanation. What makes a given connection explanatory is not
determined exclusively by the system in question but also by the epistemic community posing the request for explanation. Generally speaking, explanations are answers to why questions. But what answers a
given why question can only be assessed if one considers the context in
which such a question is being posed. Imagine a house fire.
Here, the request for explanation: "why did this fire occur?" will
have different answers for different epistemic contexts. For the police,
the explanation hinges on the connection between the fire and the arsonist that started it. For the chemists, the explanation will lie on the combustion processes — and so on and so forth. As Bas van Frassen 36 has
pointed out, "explanation" is a contextual term. The idea of an entirely
system-based complete, absolute, or de-contextualized explanation
makes little sense.
Whether an explanation is good or not is determined both by the
epistemic community in question and the nature of the system in question. This point is particularly relevant when comparing the contexts
within which different traditions generate causal or why questions. In
our case, since we are dealing with scientific knowledge, the request for
explanation must be understood as a request for relevant causal connections — because that is what the scientists' epistemic community is
after.37 Whether the causal connections that explain are the tiniest parts,
or the most global of wholes, will depend on the nature of the process
in question. Let us spell this out with the help of the wolf reintroduction
example.
As our Yellowstone example illustrates, nature is heavily interconnected. Nonetheless, science discloses that only some of these connections are causally relevant. If one were to follow Capra's conflated conception of connection, one would have to argue that you, as the reader
of this essay, have also become connected to the wolf reintroduction
system - and this is, of course, regardless of whether or not you pay
your taxes, or pay the park's entrance fee.
Obviously, connections such as this one are causally irrelevant to
the reintroduction system. 38 Against Capra, explaining this system does
not necessitate knowledge of all conceivable, and inconceivable!, connections, but only those that are causally relevant. In the Yellowstone
system, the latter are those whose extraction (or insertion) alters the
nature of the system. Extract wolves, put wolves back in, and the highly interconnected system will respond accordingly. Extract you, as a
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mere reader (sorry about that), and the system will remain utterly
unconcerned.
Again, notice that both introduced Canadian wolf packs, and your
present reading of this essay, are connected (in a Capran sense) to the
shifting of beaver populations in Yellowstone Park. But it would be silly
to argue that the reading connection makes a causal (scientifically relevant) difference, or explains anything about the dynamics of the park's
system.
Finally, let me clarify the (very slippery) use of the word "relevant"
thus far. As Robert Brandon 19 has pointed out, variations in some connection nodes screen off variations in others. Wolves are thus said to
cause a difference and that is why wolves explain. In short, science is
only after such screen-off, causal connections. It is not, as Capra seems
to indicate, that these connections are more or less "relevant" (whatever that means) or that our scientific focus on them makes our explanation "approximate" (again, whatever that means).
The point is that scientific explanations are myopic by demand of
the empirical system in question. These explanations require the recognition of only those connections whose triggering screens off nil others.
Or, to put it slightly differently, scientific explanation requires one to
disregard all those connections whose triggering happens to make no
difference in the empirical system in question. It is in syntheses of the
"totality" of EM and the "myopic focusing" of WS that the traditions of
EM and WS prove most fruitful across the boundaries of civilizations.
In such syntheses EM and WS can provide a complementary aspect to
each other. This emphasis upon aspect is, I think, what motivated the
Nobel Physicist, Niels Bohr, to put the Chinese Yin-Yang symbol upon
his own coat of arms.
Interconnectedness and the In-Principle Problem
Now, where does the above discussion leave Capra's case for interconnectedness as a key engine behind the new sciences' paradigm shift?
Not in very good shape. The existence of intense interconnectedness
cannot create the necessary discontinuity to establish a gap between
paradigms. Remember that contiguous paradigms are incommensurable. Obviously, a greater degree of interconnectedness, even hugely
greater degree of interconnectedness, only amounts to a change in
degree. And a change that hinges on a matter of degree is, by definition,
continuous.
Explanation in systems with greater interconnectedness might
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make the work of the researcher more difficult as he/she now has more
usual suspects to look into, but it does not amount to a clean break in
the researcher's conception of explanation. So, all in all, no Kuhnian
paradigm shifting here.
As it should be clear now, all the other elements in Capra's list of
shifting elements in WS suffer from the same in-principle problem.
Shifting, for instance, from systems structured as foundational hierarchies, to systems structured by internal coherence; or from theorizingbased knowledge to intervening-based knowledge, cannot result in the
kind of discontinuity required by a Kuhnian paradigm shift. Members
of any of these alternative sets of would-be Kuhnian paradigms might
disagree to some degree or other, but still in a perfectly commensurable
way.
Conclusion
This paper could be divided into two main sections. In the first one,
I hope to have shown that the parallels between EM and WS are heuristically valuable but substantially uninteresting. In this second section, I
have tried to identify a fatal flaw in Capra's construal of interconnectedness as a crucial driver in W S ' paradigm shift.
First, I have argued that (infinite) interconnectedness is irrelevant
to the question of explanation. Second, I have shown that explanation
does not entail the knowledge of all interconnections but the identification of key causal ones. Third, I have shown that the discovery of a vastly interconnected world, where sometimes wholes, and sometimes parts
explain phenomena, should not alter the scientific worldview substantially. At least, it shouldn't create an incommensurable gap, where, as
we saw Kuhn demand, "the two groups of scientists see different things
when they look from the same point in the same direction."
Pre-shift scientists might trust parts as their best bet when it comes
to postulate their hypothesis (i.e. methodological reductionism). Or they
might look at the proposed degree of interconnectedness with a high
degree of skepticism. Post-shift scientists, on the other hand, might be
inclined to consider holistic or relational explanations when they postulate hypothesis to explain some system-wide phenomena.
But (against Kuhn and Capra) the two groups see (to paraphrase
Kuhn - see quote above) the same thing "when they look from the same
point in the same direction." Their clash is only a disagreement regarding which causal connection is truly responsible, i.e. explanatory for the
phenomenon in question. All in all, Capra has failed to build a case for
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a Kuhnian paradigm shift in WS.
The new WS that emerges should remind you of several of the
tenets of EM. For instance, wholes matter, but still, depending on the
system in question, so do parts. Sometimes, with very small wavicles,
the observer makes a difference, but this should not be confused with
universal subjectivism. Theories are not pictures, but maps of relevant,
contextual, dynamic, bundles of causal properties. So, there are shifts in
emphasis, amalgamation, and coincidences. But no paradigms shifts.
Most definitely no paradigm shifts in a Kuhnian sense. Sir Isaac
Newton and Albert Einstein, or Charles Darwin and Stephen Jay Gould,
can disagree, but they can look in the same direction and still exchange
notes.
Finally, I would like to suggest that, although the comparison the
EM and WS provided here has dealt primarily with the physical sciences, especially physics and biology, this comparison of traditions and
their contexts could and should be extended to include the social sciences including history and comparative approaches to the comparative
study of civilizations.
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